The effect of category variability in perceptual categorization by Stewart, Neil & Chater, Nick
  
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
 
Author(s) Stewart, Neil and Chater, Nick  
Article Title: The effect of category variability in perceptual 
categorization 
Year of publication: 2002 
Link to published version:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.28.5.893
Publisher statement: 'This article may not exactly replicate the final 
version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.' 
 
 
The Effect     1
Running Head: CATEGORY VARIABILITY
The Effect of Category Variability in Perceptual Categorization
Neil Stewart and Nick Chater
University of Warwick, England
Stewart, N., & Chater, N. (2002). The effect of category variability in perceptual
categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 28, 893-907.
The Effect     2
Abstract
Exemplar and distributional accounts of categorization make differing predictions for the
classification of a critical exemplar precisely halfway between the nearest exemplars of two
categories differing in variability. Under standard conditions of sequential presentation, the
critical exemplar was classified into the most similar, least variable category, consistent with
an exemplar account. However, if the difference in variability is made more salient, then the
same exemplar is classified into the more variable, most likely category, consistent with a
distributional account. This suggests that participants may be strategic in their use of either
strategy. However, when the relative variability of two categories was manipulated,
participants showed changes in the classification of intermediate exemplars that neither
approach could account for. 
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The Effect of Category Variability in Perceptual Categorization
In this article we consider the accounts of classification given by two successful models
of categorization. Exemplar models (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) assume
the categorization of a new exemplar is based on the similarity of the new exemplars to the
representations of previously encountered exemplars stored in memory. An alternative is that
probability distributions are used to represent categories and that these distributions are fitted
by using the encountered exemplars. Classification of a new exemplar is based on the relative
likelihood of belonging to each distribution. This alternative will be called the distributional
approach (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986). 
The difference between these two accounts may be illustrated with a simple example in
which the two accounts make qualitatively different predictions. Consider two categories (see
Figure 1). The exemplars of one category may be more variable than the exemplars of the
other category. If a critical exemplar exactly halfway between nearest exemplars of the two
categories is presented it may be classified into either category. (The term critical exemplar is
used to denote a novel test exemplar exactly halfway between the nearest neighbors of two
categories.) 
Exemplar models predict that the critical exemplar should be categorized as a member
of the low-variability category more often than the high-variability category.1 Intuitively, this is
because the critical exemplar is, on average, nearer in perceptual space to the exemplars of the
low-variability category and is therefore likely to be more similar to the exemplars of the low-
variability category. Distributional models predict that the critical exemplar is more likely to be
classified into the high-variability category. If the presumed distribution is Gaussian (see
Figure 1), then the intermediate exemplar will typically, though not definitely,2 be classified as
a member of the high variance category because the tight bunching of the low variance
exemplars means that the critical exemplar is more standard deviations from the mean of the
low variance category. (It is assumed here that the frequencies of each category are equal - in
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the experiments below, there is indeed no bias in favor of one category or the other.) 
In summary, the exemplar and distributional models often make different predictions
about the classification of a critical exemplar midway between the nearest exemplars from two
categories differing in variability. We evaluate participants' performance on such a critical
exemplar in Experiment 1. This idea is extended in Experiments 2 and 3, in which we
investigate the effect of changing the relative variability of the two categories. 
The effects of category variability on generalization have been addressed in two
important studies: Rips (1989) and Fried and Holyoak (1984). Rips used a binary
categorization with categories of differing variability to dissociate similarity and categorization
judgments. Participants were presented with sentences giving information about an object's
value on a single dimension. In one condition participants had to classify the object as a
member of one of two available categories on the basis of this information alone. In another
condition, participants were asked to choose the category to which the object was more
similar.3 The value of the object on the selected dimension was chosen to be halfway between
the participant's estimates of the lowest value of the high value category, and the highest value
of the low value category. Participants were told this is how the test value they were given
was derived. Rips found that similarity decisions favored the low-variability category but that
categorization decisions favored the high-variability category. Rips took the dissociation
between similarity and categorization as evidence that categorization decisions were not based
on similarity decisions. Empirical evidence from Smith and Sloman (1994) provided a
pertinent boundary condition on this dissociation. They found that Rips's dissociation of
categorization and similarity is only obtained under conditions that require verbal
rationalization of the categorization decision. 
Rips's (1989) study leaves open the question of the effect of category variability in
perceptual categorization, the topic of the present article, for two reasons. First, Rips used
familiar semantic categories to encourage participants to use prior knowledge from outside the
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experimental context. Such knowledge is not available for the kinds of abstract perceptual
stimuli traditionally used in perceptual categorization experiments (although it may well be
available for natural perceptual categories). Second, the effect that Rips described does not
seem to be robust in conditions most analogous to those of a typical perceptual categorization
task (where participants do not produce verbal protocols). 
Fried and Holyoak (1984) have shown that participants are sensitive to the relative
variability of perceptual categories. They found that participants classified some checkerboard
patterns physically closer to the prototype (or mean) of a lower variability category as
members of the high-variability category. Fried and Holyoak had predicted these findings with
their category density model and interpret these findings as support for a distributional
approach. However it is also consistent with exemplar-based categorization, as it is much
more likely that there will be more exemplars from the high-variability category near the
transfer checkerboard than exemplars from the low-variability category, simply because the
checkerboards from the high-variability category are more scattered from their prototype. A
second issue regarding Fried and Holyoak's interpretation is that their similarity estimate (i.e.,
number of squares in common) may lead to a incorrect assumptions about the representation
of these checkerboard stimuli. To a first approximation it may be that the largest invariant
chunk of a stimulus is learned as a feature (McLaren, 1997; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001;
Stewart, 2001; Wills & McLaren, 1998). Because the low-variability category's exemplars
vary less, this would lead to the creation of larger functional features for this category. If this
were the case, then an exemplar equally distant between the two categories may indeed be
more similar to the high-variability category simply because the probability of the presence of
larger chunks used to represent the low-variability category is much lower than for the high-
variability category. 
What is needed is a category structure that allows the similarity and distributional
models to be distinguished, even when memory for individual exemplars is allowed (as it is in
The Effect     6
the hugely successful exemplar models). Such a structure, illustrated in Figure 1, was offered
above. 
Modeling Sensitivity to Category Variability
To confirm the intuitive argument that exemplar and distributional models of
categorization make opposite predictions, we examine two existing models of categorization
in this section: the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) and normal general
recognition theory (Normal GRT; Ashby & Townsend, 1986). 
First consider the predictions of the GCM. In the GCM, each encountered exemplar is
represented as a point in a perceptual space. To classify a new exemplar, the similarity
between the new exemplar and each stored exemplar is calculated. (Similarity is a decreasing
function of the distance between exemplars in perceptual space.) Similarities are then summed
for each category. Luce's (1959) choice rule is used on the summed similarities to calculate the
probability that the exemplar is classified into a given category. Figure 2A plots the probability
that the exemplar is classified into the high-variability category as a function of the exemplar's
location. This function is referred to as the generalization gradient. The different gradients
correspond to different values of the generalization parameter, c. For broad generalization
(i.e., small c) the similarity of a given exemplar to more distant exemplars will be larger than
for narrow generalization (i.e., large c). Thus when generalization is narrow, the generalization
gradient is steeper. Provided the exemplars are appropriately arranged, the model predicts that
the critical exemplar is most likely to be classified into the low-variability category for any
value of the generalization parameter. The predictions here are for the GCM with a Gaussian
function (q = 2) relating similarity to distance. The predictions of the GCM with an
exponential similarity function (q = 1) do not differ qualitatively. 
We illustrate the distributional approach by using Normal GRT. Normal GRT is an
extension of standard GRT. In standard GRT each exemplar is represented by a normal
distribution in perceptual space. Thus standard GRT would make similar predictions to the
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GCM, as each model assumes (some) memory for each exemplar. In contrast, in Normal GRT
each category, rather than each exemplar, is represented by a single normal distribution. Ashby
(1992) made the strong assumption that many natural categories can be represented by a
normal distribution even when the true distribution is not normal. In Normal GRT, the
category exemplars are used to infer a population mean and variance for the normal
representation for each category. An optimal decision bound is then calculated that divides the
perceptual space into regions for each category, so that all the exemplars represented by points
in the same region are most likely to belong to a common category. In the one dimensional
case for two categories of unequal variance, the optimal decision bound will be a pair of
points, with the lower variability category in between the two points and the higher variability
category outside the pair. Perception is assumed to be noisy in GRT. Thus an exemplar near
the decision bound may sometimes be perceived to fall on one side of the bound and
sometimes on the other. To apply Normal GRT to the category structure for Experiment 1, we
used the eight exemplars for each category to generate an estimate of the population mean and
a variance of the normal distribution form which the exemplars were generated.4 The optimal
decision bound was then calculated. The exact predictions for classification of exemplars near
the decision bound depend on the level of perceptual noise (p). Following Ashby and
Townsend (1986) we assumed the perceptual noise to be Gaussian. Figure 2B illustrates three
generalization gradients. The less noise, the steeper the generalization gradient. Crucially
though, the level of noise changes the slope of the generalization gradient but does not alter
the location of the optimal decision bound. 
In summary, for a critical exemplar that lies exactly between the nearest neighbors of
two categories that differ in variability, the GCM often predicts this critical exemplar is more
likely to be classified into the low-variability category (independent of the amount of
generalization), and Normal GRT predicts that the critical exemplar is more likely to be
classified into the high-variability category (independent of the amount of perceptual noise). 
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Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to discriminate between exemplar-based classification and
distribution-based classification by using a category structure as described above. In one
condition participants were given a hint telling them that the two categories differed in
variability. E. E. Smith and Sloman's (1994) replications of Rips's (1989) study suggest that
participants categorize stimuli into the high-variability category only when their verbal
protocols show awareness of a difference in variability between the two categories. The hint
here was included to see what effect knowledge of the variability difference might have on
participants' classification. The method of presentation of the exemplars was manipulated as an
additional between participants factor. During the learning phase exemplars were either
presented sequentially or simultaneously. We hypothesized that simultaneous presentation
should make the difference in the variability of the categories more salient. 
Method
Participants. Sixty-four undergraduate students from the University of Warwick
participated for course credit. 
Design. Participants performed three binary categorization tasks. There was a separate
stimulus set for each of the three tasks. After learning 16 training exemplars, participants
classified a critical exemplar that fell halfway between the nearest exemplar of the low-
variability category and the nearest exemplar of the high-variability category. They then
classified two further verification exemplars, one from each category, before moving on to the
next classification. There were two between participants factors: (a) simultaneous or
sequential presentation of training exemplars, and (b) whether participants were given a hint
that one category was more variable than the other. 
Stimuli. An example stimulus set is shown in Figure 3. The stimuli used in this
experiment were outline circles each with a single solid dot somewhere on their circumference.
The diameter of the circle subtended approximately 2 of visual angle. The stimuli varied only
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in the position of the dot around the circumference; this position was diagnostic of category
membership. Pilot studies used the position of the dot on a straight line, but the performance
of many participants was consistent with their reports of using a rule, such as whether the dot
was more or less than halfway along the line, to make their decision. The stimuli here were
chosen so that use of rules like this (e.g., using horizontal, vertical or diagonal diameters as
decision bounds) should not be possible. 
For each participant, for each category, eight exemplars were generated from a normal
distribution. The low-variability category distribution had a standard deviation of 11, and the
high-variability category had a standard deviation of 28. There was a gap of 56 between the
nearest exemplars of each category, with the critical exemplar lying exactly in the center of
this gap. To ensure the gap between the nearest neighbors of each category was constant for
all participants, the means of the categories needed to be adjusted slightly for each participant.
The critical exemplar was in the 45 position for the first task, the 135 position for the second
task, and the 225 position for the third task (with 0 being at the 12 o'clock position and angle
increasing counterclockwise). The relative position of the low and high variability categories
was counterbalanced across participants.
Because the exact predictions of the GCM and GRT depend on the particular
distribution of exemplars, all of the stimulus sets were modeled to check that the critical
exemplar was indeed more similar to the low-variability category but more likely to belong to
the high-variability category. This was always the case.
Apparatus. For the sequential presentation condition stimuli were displayed on a 14-in.
(36-cm) Apple Macintosh Color Display and responses were collected by using labeled keys
on a standard qwerty keyboard (the keys A to J inclusive were labeled A, B, C, yes, D, E, and
F respectively). For the simultaneous presentation condition, stimuli were presented in an A4
booklet and responses written into the booklet. 
Procedure. The experiment began with instructions telling participants they would do
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three categorization tasks, one after the other. Participants in the hint condition received
further instructions telling them that one (but not which) category was allowed a greater
spread of dots than the other. They were instructed to try to identify the category that had the
greater spread of dots during the experiment. 
In the sequential presentation condition each trial began with a ready prompt. When a
participant pressed a yes, there was a 1.5-s blank screen before a circle with a dot appeared on
the screen for 1 s. Participants responded as quickly and accurately as they could from
stimulus onset. The assignment of category labels to the high- and low-variability categories
was counterbalanced across participants. After 1 s, the screen was cleared, whether the
participant had responded or not. After the participant responded, the correct answer was
displayed on the screen for 1.5 s, followed by a 1.5-s blank screen before the next trial began.
The feedback for the critical exemplar was random, so participants' attention was not drawn to
the special status of the critical exemplar (which might have affected performance on later
stimulus sets). 
The same stimuli were used for the simultaneous presentation condition, which began
with presentation of the first stimulus set. Each set of eight exemplars belonging to the same
category was arranged in a row, inside a rectangle, together with the category label. The two
sets were placed one above the other. The placement of the low- and high-variability
categories at the top and bottom of the page was counterbalanced across participants, as was
the assignment of labels to categories. Within a set, the exemplars were arranged in the same
(random) rank order for all participants to ensure that if the order of the exemplars on the
page affected the salience of the variability, then it would be held constant across conditions.
Participants studied the sheet of exemplars for 1 min and then it was removed from sight. The
critical exemplar was then presented in the center of a new piece of paper. Participants circled
the category label to which they thought the exemplar belonged. This was repeated with the
verification exemplars.
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Results
Data were collapsed across all three stimulus sets. For the sequential condition, the
mean training proportion correct was high (no hint: mean proportion correct = .81, SE = .02;
hint mean proportion correct = .79, SE = .02), and did not differ between the hint and no-hint
conditions, t(31)=0.85, p > .05. No training data were collected in the simultaneous
presentation condition. However, performance can be compared across the simultaneous and
sequential conditions by using the verification trials. Verification performance averaged across
all conditions was high (mean proportion correct = .93, SE = .02). A two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) (Hint x Presentation) revealed no effect of hint, F(1, 60) = 1.56, p > .05,
no effect of presentation, F(1, 60)=0.39, p > .05, and no significant interaction, F(1, 60) =
0.00, p > .05. In summary, knowledge that the two categories differed in variability did not
facilitate category learning and neither did presentation method.
Of most interest is performance on the critical exemplar. Table 1 shows the proportion
of high variability responses averaged across all three critical exemplars. A two-way ANOVA
(Hint x Presentation) was run. Simultaneous presentation increased the proportion of high
variability responses, F(1, 60) = 18.56, p < .05, as did giving a hint that the two categories
differed in variability, F(1, 60) = 5.96, p < .05. There was no significant interaction, F(1, 60) =
0.52, p > .05. Planned t-tests were run to see which means differed significantly from chance
performance of .5. For the sequential presentation conditions, the proportion of high
variability responses was significantly below chance for both the hint condition, t(15) = 7.31, p
< .05 and the no-hint conditions t(15) = 13.17, p < .05. For the simultaneous presentation
condition the proportion of high variability responses was not significantly different from
chance for the no hint condition, t(15) = 0.13, p > .05, but was significantly above chance for
the hint condition, t(15) = 3.61, p > .05.
Discussion
In this experiment a critical exemplar lying midway between the nearest exemplars of
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two categories differing in their variability was significantly more likely than chance to be
classified as belonging to the lower variability category when training exemplars were
presented sequentially. This pattern of classification is consistent with the prediction of
exemplar models - that is, that the critical exemplar should be classified into the more similar
category. When training exemplars were presented simultaneously, participants were
significantly more likely to classify exemplars into the high-variability category than when they
were presented sequentially. When participants were given a hint that the two categories
differed in variability they were significantly more likely to classify the critical exemplar into
the high-variability category. In combination, simultaneous presentation and hint caused
participants to classify the critical exemplar into the higher variability category more often than
chance, consistent with the predictions of distributional models - that is, that the critical
exemplar should be classified into the category most likely to have generated it. However,
both models were originally designed to explain sequential categorization performance, and
the data collected under sequential presentation conditions here support an exemplar account
rather than a distributional account. 
Note that this experiment provides no evidence that the critical exemplar was midway
between the nearest exemplars of the two categories in participants' psychological space.
However, it is at least reasonable to assume that the psychological-space critical exemplar
must be in the region of the test critical exemplar that was actually presented. Therefore given
the large sizes of the effects of presentation and hint, even if the psychological-space critical
exemplar does not coincide precisely with the physical space critical exemplar, its classification
would also be strongly influenced by these factors.
There are two possible alternative accounts of these findings. The first is that changing
the method of presentation and providing a variability hint alters the representation of the
categories that participants form, rather than altering the classification strategy they use.
Consider how this account would work if participants were using an exemplar strategy in all
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conditions of this experiment. The shift to classification of the critical exemplar into the high-
variability category with simultaneous presentation and hint would have to be explained as
exemplars of the high-variability category being closer in perceptual space to the critical
exemplar under these conditions compared with the sequential presentation and no hint
conditions. However, the switch from sequential presentation and no hint to simultaneous
presentation and hint was intended to have exactly the opposite effect (i.e., to draw attention
to the variability difference). Thus although this alternative account remains a possibility, it
does not seem plausible. However, consider how the changing representation account would
explain these data if participants were using a distributional strategy throughout the
experiment. In this case, switching from sequential to simultaneous presentation and providing
the variability hint should allow participants to assign a larger variability distribution to the
more variable category in the simultaneous hint condition rather than the sequential no hint
condition. This leads to the prediction that the critical exemplar will be classified into the high-
variability category most often in the simultaneous hint condition. In the sequential condition,
when the difference in variability is not salient, participants might assume that the two
categories had equal variance. Thus as the critical exemplar is nearer to the mean of the low-
variability category, the distributional account predicts that it should be classified into this
category most often. Both of these predictions are consistent with these data.
The second alternative account of these data is that the response bias changes
systematically between these conditions. To account for these data, the bias for the high-
variability category would have to have increased when presentation was switched from
sequential to simultaneous presentation and a hint was provided. We return to this possible
account below.
Sensitivity of Exemplar and Distributional Models to Changes in the Relative
Variability of Categories
In Experiment 2 we investigate how changing the relative variability of two categories
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should affect the classification of intermediate exemplars. (The term intermediate exemplars
denotes any exemplars between the two categories, in contrast to the use of the term critical
exemplar.) The category structures used are illustrated in the top panel of Figure 4, and are
described in detail in the Design and Stimuli section of Experiment 2. The stimuli were
rectangles or ellipsis, defined by their height and width. One pair of categories had standard
deviations in the ratio of 1:2; the other pair had standard deviations in the ratio of 1:4. Across
conditions, the low-variability categories had equal means. The high-variability categories also
had equal means. Finally, the distance between the nearest neighbors of each category was
constant across the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. 
Given the category representation of the Normal GRT, it seems likely that this model
would be sensitive to differences in the relative variability of two categories. This is indeed the
case. All the categories are represented using simple covariance matrices ( = 2I) because of
the symmetrical nature of the categories. In general, with two bivariate normal categories
differing in covariance matrix the decision bound is quadratic (Ashby, 1992, p. 460). Here we
modeled performance for stimuli lying on the line between the two category means (i.e.,
height = width). As in modeling for the category structure used in Experiment 1, the
perceptual noise changes the shape of the generalization gradient but does not bias the
decision bound (i.e., the point at which a stimulus is equally likely to be classified into either
category) one way or the other. Of interest here is the comparison of gradients for the 1:2 and
1:4 conditions. One generalization gradient for each condition is shown in Figure 5A. (The
level of perceptual noise is assumed constant across both structures, p = 10.) As the
difference in variability between the two categories is increased the decision bound moves
nearer to the low-variability category.
The variances of each category were chosen to keep the distance between the nearest
exemplars of each category constant across the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. This allows an
alternative comparison in which the classification of intermediate exemplars that are the same
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distance from the nearest neighbor of the low-variability category is contrasted (i.e., with the
same coordinates, relative to the nearest neighbors). Because the distance between the nearest
neighbors of each category is held constant across the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions, intermediate
exemplars that are equally distant from the nearest neighbor of the low-variability category
across conditions must also be equally distant from the nearest neighbor of the high-variability
category across conditions. For comparison of exemplars with either the same absolute
coordinates (see Figure 5A), or the same coordinates relative to the nearest neighbors (see
Figure 5C), each exemplar is always predicted to be more likely to be classified into the high-
variability category in the 1:4 condition compared with the 1:2 condition. This is always true
for any level of perceptual noise because perceptual noise alters only the slope of the
generalization gradient and not the location of the decision bound.
The generalization gradients predicted by the GCM for the two category structures are
also shown in Figure 5B, with the generalization parameter held constant (c = 0.05) across the
two structures. The predictions here are for the GCM with a Euclidean distance metric (r = 2)
and a Gaussian similarity function (q = 2): however, the pattern of the predictions is the same
for a city block distance metric (r = 1) and exponential similarity function (q = 1). The
predictions of the GCM are similar to those of Normal GRT. In the 1:4 condition, the high-
variability category's exemplars are nearer, and the low-variability category's exemplars are
further away, from a given intermediate exemplar, compared with the 1:2 condition. Therefore
exemplars intermediate between the two categories are more likely to be classified as members
of the high-variability category in the 1:4 condition than the 1:2 condition. However, when the
generalization gradients are measured relative to the two nearest neighbors, this is no longer
true (see Figure 5D). When exemplars an equal distance from the nearest neighbor of the low-
variability category in each condition are compared, classification into the high-variability
category is more likely in the 1:2 condition because the second nearest neighbors of the high-
variability category are nearer in the 1:2 condition than in the 1:4 condition and the second
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nearest neighbors are of the low-variability category are further away in the 1:2 condition than
in the 1:4 condition. (Note that this follows because (a) the exemplars of the high-variability
category are more spread out in the 1:4 condition than in the 1:2 condition and (b) the low-
variability category exemplars are less spread out in the 1:4 condition than in the 1:2
condition.) This prediction is the opposite prediction to Normal GRT. For these category
structures it is trivial to prove that this prediction is true for all amounts of generalization.5
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 generalization gradients were obtained for participants after training
on both the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. Experiment 2 sets out to find which model describes the
behavior of participants, both at the level of across participant averages and also at the level of
individual participants. It is important to consider performance at the level of individual
participants, particularly in view of the demonstration by Maddox (1999; see also Ashby,
Maddox, & Lee, 1994) that data averaged across participants might not reflect individual
participant data, especially when large individual differences exist. Using Monte Carlo
simulation, Maddox generated data sets from either GRT or from the GCM. When the GCM
was the correct model, averaging had little effect. However, when GRT was the correct model
and therefore perfectly described the generated data, averaging led to a better fit for the GCM.
This implies that averaging the data alters the qualitative structure of the data. Thus, averaged
data should not be used to compare the two models, as averaging the data biases the result in
favor of the GCM. 
Method
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduates from the University of Warwick participated
for course credit, or payment of £5 (U.S. $7.39). 
Design and Stimuli. Each participant completed two categorization training and
transfer tasks. In the training stage, participants learned to categorize stimuli that varied in
height and width into one of two categories, with trial-by-trial feedback. In the transfer stage
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participants classified old training exemplars and new transfer exemplars without feedback.
The tasks differed in the category structure used (see Figure 4A). Both category
structures had two categories, one with a mean of (200, 200) pixels and the other with a mean
of (300, 300) pixels. The 10 exemplars of each category were arranged in a circle around each
mean. In the 1:2 condition the low-variability category was half as variable as the high-
variability category (standard deviation of 20.0 vs. 40.0 on each dimension), and in the 1:4
condition the low-variability category was about four times less variable than the high-
variability category (standard deviation of 12.7 vs. 50.2 on each dimension). In the transfer
stage, additional exemplars intermediate in height and width between the two categories were
included to measure the generalization gradient.
The order of learning the 1:2 and 1:4 tasks was counterbalanced across participants.
To minimize carry-over effects, in one condition stimuli were rectangles of varying height and
width and in the other condition stimuli were ellipses of varying height and width. The
assignment of shape to condition was counterbalanced across participants. The assignment of
labels to categories was also counterbalanced. Finally, the assignment of variability to the
category of either small or large stimuli was also counterbalanced. That is, for half the
participants, the category with the smaller stimuli was the less variable category (as in Figure
4A), and for the other half, the category with the larger stimuli was the more variable category
(the mirror image of Figure 4A, about the line height+width = 500). 
It is not always the case that a category structure in psychological space reflects the
structure of the category in the experimenter's choice of physical space (e.g., Palmeri &
Nosofsky, 2001). A separate experiment, not reported here, was run in which pairwise
similarity judgments were obtained for the stimuli used. The individual differences
multidimensional scaling model (Carroll & Wish, 1974; Shepard, 1980) was used to derive
solutions for the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. Examination of the solutions confirmed that the ratio
of the mean interexemplar distance within each category was greater for the 1:4 condition than
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for the 1:2 condition. This supports the key assumption in this experiment - that the
representation of one category was indeed more variable than the other, and further, that the
difference in variability was greater in the 1:4 condition than in the 1:2 condition.
There is some debate on the nature of the psychological representation of rectangles
(e.g., Feldman & Richards, 1998; Krantz & Tversky, 1975; Macmillan & Ornstein, 1998;
Monahan & Lockhead, 1977). Krantz and Tversky (1975) suggested that dimensions of area
(a = h.w) and shape (s = h/w) may be more appropriate than height (h) and width (w). Further,
the space may also be subject to Weberian compression for larger heights and widths.
However, under transformation to a s space, log(h) log(w) space and log(a) log(s) space, the
qualitative properties outlined in the previous paragraph remain unaltered.6
Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 14-in (36-cm) Apple Macintosh Color Display.
Responses were collected using labeled keys on a standard qwerty keyboard. The keys Z and
X were labeled A and B respectively.
Procedure. Each trial started with presentation of a stimulus until the participant
responded. Feedback was given on the screen for 1,500 ms. The feedback was the correct
category label, presented as a letter (A or B) 50 pixels high below the stimulus. The stimulus
remained on the screen until the end of the feedback. The screen was then blank for 500 ms
before the next trial began automatically. The sequence of 100 trials comprised five repetitions
of the 20 training exemplars. In each repetition, the trials were in a random order. The 328
transfer trials comprised eight repetitions of 41 exemplars. Of the 41 exemplars, 20 were the
old training exemplars; the remaining 21 transfer exemplars were novel exemplars located in
between the two categories in height-width space. Within each repetition, the 41 exemplars
were displayed in a random order. The structure of a trial was the same as in training, except
the feedback was omitted. After a participant had responded, the screen was cleared, and the
next trial began after a 500-ms pause. When participants had completed the first categorization
task, they moved on to a second task, which was the same as the first except that the category
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structure was swapped, as was the type of shape. No instruction that the categories differed in
variability was given.
Results
Average results. Participants were very accurate in their training classifications. On
average, the mean proportion of correct responses in training was .91. A six-way ANOVA
(Category Mean and Variance Assignment x Category Label x Condition Order x Rectangle or
Ellipse x Condition x Category) was run to check that none of the counterbalanced factors or
the category structure affected training performance. There was a significant effect of category
mean and variance assignment, corresponding to a slight improvement in accuracy when the
category with the low mean had the lower variance (.94 vs. .91), F(1, 16) = 7.03, p < .05.
This effect was not found in transfer. There were no other significant main effects, F(1, 16) =
1.42, p = .25.
Performance on old training exemplars was also excellent during transfer. The
proportion of high-variability category responses to old training exemplars is shown in Table
2. A six-way ANOVA (Category Mean and Variance Assignment x Category Label x
Condition Order x Rectangle or Ellipse x Condition x Category) revealed a main effect of
category, F(1, 16) = 6.54, p < .05. Although performance was high on training exemplars in
test, exemplars of the low-variability category are classified slightly less accurately than
exemplars of the high variability category (mean proportion correct  = .89 versus .96). There
were no other significant main effects, largest F(1, 16) = 2.32, p > .05. This indicates that no
counterbalanced factor had a significant effect on old training exemplar classification in
transfer. 
It is the performance on the new transfer exemplars that is of interest. The responses
given to each of the 21 new transfer exemplars are collapsed into seven sets, so that responses
to stimuli whose projections onto the line height = width coincide were in the same set. Figure
6A shows a plot of the proportion of high-variability responses given to stimuli in each of the
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seven sets as a function of their size. Figure 6A can therefore be thought of as showing a
generalization gradient. A six-way ANOVA (Condition x Stimulus Set x Category Mean
Category Variance Assignment x Category Label x Condition Order x Rectangle or Ellipse)
was run. In both the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions, the proportion of high variability responses to test
exemplars increased as the location of the test exemplar moved toward the high-variability
category, F(6, 96) = 185.77, p < .05 (Huynh-Feldt  = .82). In the 1:4 condition the
proportion of high variability responses was higher than for the 1:2 condition for every set of
test stimuli, F(1, 16) = 10.52, p < .01. There was no significant interaction between stimulus
and condition, F(6, 96) = 1.67, p > .05 (Huynh-Feldt  = 1.00). There were no other
significant main effects, largest F(1, 16) = 1.06, p > .05, showing that none of the
counterbalanced factors affected responding significantly. 
By analyzing the results as above, we compared classification of exemplars that are
equally distant from the mean of the low-variability category (or the mean of the high-
variability category - the two comparisons are equivalent given the category structures used
here) across the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions. However, an exemplar that is equally distant from the
low-variability category mean in the 1:2 and 1:4 conditions is not equally distant from the
nearest exemplar of the low-variability category in both conditions. The following analysis
compares exemplars that are equally distant from the nearest exemplar of the low-variability
category across the two conditions. (As the distance between the nearest neighbors of each
category was the same for both conditions, it does not matter whether distance is measured
relative to the position of the low-variability category's nearest exemplar or to the high-
variability category's nearest exemplar.) Such a comparison is shown in Figure 6B. (If one
shifts the 1:2 data in Figure 6A one unit to the left one obtains Figure 6B.) Another six-way
ANOVA (Condition x Stimulus Set x Category Mean Category Variance Assignment x
Category Label x Condition Order x Rectangle or Ellipse) was run. Unsurprisingly, as before,
as the location of the test exemplar got nearer the exemplars of the high-variability category,
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the proportion of high variability responses increased, F(5, 80) = 170.01, p < .05 (Huynh-
Feldt  = .87). However, now that position is measured relative to the nearest neighbors of
the two categories, there is no difference between the generalization gradients for the two
conditions, F(1, 16) = 0.23, p > .05. There was no stimulus by condition interaction, F(5, 80)
= 0.41, p > .05 (Huynh-Feldt  = 1.00). There were no other significant main effects, largest
F(1, 16) = 1.19, p > .05, showing that none of the factors counterbalanced across participants
affected responding significantly. 
Individual participant results. When generalization gradients were calculated for
individual participants, many participants showed very different gradients for the two
conditions. The results averaged across participants did not represent individual performance
well. Even when the effect of nearest neighbors was controlled, many participants showed a
difference in gradients. Further, for many of these participants, the change was larger than
would be expected by chance. A chi-squared analysis was performed for each participant, with
the trial as the unit of analysis. A 2 (Variability Condition)  2 (Response) contingency table
was constructed for each participant containing the frequencies of low- and high-variability
responses in each condition summed across transfer exemplars that were equally distant from
the nearest neighbors of each category. A chi-squared statistic was calculated on the basis of
the hypothesis that there should be no difference in the proportion of high variability responses
between the two conditions. Yates's continuity correction was not used, as there is no reason
to expect constant marginal totals, and the expected frequencies were large (Howell, 1997, p.
146). As the assumption that the response on each trial is independent of the response on any
other trial is unlikely to be true, the statistic was deflated to account for trials being
nonindependent (Altham, 1979; see also Tavaré & Altham, 1983). Thirteen of the 32
participants showed a significant difference between their responding in the two conditions, 7
increasing and 6 decreasing their proportion of high-variability responses as the difference in
variability between the two conditions increased. The probability of obtaining 13 or more
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significant differences (i.e., p < .05) by chance is 1.7210-9, assuming that the number of
significant results is binomially distributed (n = 32, p = .05). 
Discussion
Averaged across participants, when the difference in variability between two categories
was increased, the proportion of high variability responses to intermediate exemplars
increased. This result is consistent with the predictions of the GCM and of Normal GRT. Of
interest here is the result when the presence of nearest neighbors was taken into account. This
was done by comparing exemplars that were equally distant from the nearest neighbor of the
low-variability category across the two conditions. Averaged across participants, the
generalization gradients for the two conditions were virtually identical. This is inconsistent
with the predictions of Normal GRT but is consistent with those of the GCM (when the
amount of generalization is small). However, the individual participant data were not well
described by the average results. 
A significant minority of participants showed a significant difference in their relative
position generalization gradients between the two conditions. For about half of this minority,
the relative position generalization gradient was shifted toward the low-variability category in
the 1:2 condition compared with the 1:4 condition, consistent with the predictions of the
GCM. For the other half, the shift was in the opposite direction, consistent with GRT. The
majority of participants showed no significant change in relative position generalization
gradient. Thus at the level of individual participants, some participants were behaving as if
they were using an exemplar strategy and not a distributional strategy, and some participants
were behaving as if they were using a distributional strategy and not an exemplar strategy.
These data then do not provide support for one model over the other, and instead, at least for
a significant minority of participants, challenge both models. 
There is an alternative explanation: either the perceptual spaces formed, or the
response biases used, in each condition fluctuated randomly for each participant.7 Thus,
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participants may all be using the same categorization strategy, and the differences in the
change in generalization gradient between participants may instead be due to random
fluctuations. This is consistent with the observation that for those participants who showed a
significant difference in relative position generalization gradient, half showed a shift in one
direction and half showed a shift in the other direction. We address the possibility of such
random fluctuations in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we used the 1:2 condition described above and a new condition. This
new condition, 1:2 Expanded, differs only slightly from the 1:2 condition - in the 1:2
Expanded condition the five exemplars of the high-variability category that are furthest from
the low-variability category are moved to even more extreme points (see Figure 4B). These
two conditions are designed to allow the exemplar and distributional models to be further
tested. Figure 5F shows the generalization gradients predicted by the GCM (Gaussian
similarity function, Euclidean distance metric, c = 0.05) for the two conditions. The gradients
almost exactly coincide. This is true for the range of c parameters that produces acceptable
accuracy for the training exemplars (i.e., greater than 80% accuracy - participants in fact
performed at about 90% accuracy). This can be explained intuitively as follows. When
classifying exemplars from one category, the amount of generalization must be small enough
to prevent generalization to exemplars in the other category. When the generalization is this
small, the distant exemplars of the high-variability category in both category structures have
only an infinitesimal level of similarity to the intermediate exemplars and thus have a negligible
role in the classification of the intermediate exemplars. Therefore, moving these distant
exemplars to even more distant locations in perceptual space should have no effect. In
summary, if the GCM is to predict realistic accuracy for classification of old training
exemplars, it is constrained to predict no difference between classification of intermediate
exemplars between the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions. 
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As described above, the distant exemplars of the high-variability category in the 1:2
Expanded structure were moved to a distant location. This movement causes the high-
variability category mean to move to a slightly more distant location in space. Modeling with
Normal GRT for the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions shows that the effect of the increase in
variability is almost exactly canceled out by this movement of the mean (see Figure 5E). The
two generalization gradients are almost identical and are certainly empirically
indistinguishable. Normal GRT then makes the same prediction as the GCM - that is, that
there should be no difference in the generalization gradients for the two conditions. 
Both the exemplar and distributional approaches were unable to predict the large
variation between individuals demonstrated in Experiment 2. However, if some participants
are assumed to apply an exemplar approach and some a distributional approach, this variation
might be explained. Our aim for Experiment 3 was to discriminate between these two
possibilities. As demonstrated above, the GCM and Normal GRT predict no difference
between the generalization gradients for the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions. However, the
category structures used here are very similar to those used in Experiment 2, so there is good
reason to expect replication of the large individual differences.
Method
This experiment differs from Experiment 2 only in the category structures used. 
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduates from the University of Warwick participated
for course credit or payment of £5 (U.S. $7.39). No participant had taken part in any other
experiment in this study.
Stimuli. The stimuli in the 1:2 condition were the same as in Experiment 2. A new
category structure, 1:2 Expanded (see Figure 4B), replaced the 1:4 structure. 
As in Experiment 2, a separate multidimensional scaling experiment (not presented
here) was run. Using the same method as described in Experiment 2, the ratio of the recovered
mean within category interexemplar distances was greater in the 1:2 Expanded condition than
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in the 1:2 condition. The similarity between the intermediate exemplars and the far exemplars
of the high-variability category in both the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions (when calculated
as in the GCM) was negligible compared with the similarity to other training exemplars, for c
parameters large enough to produce acceptable accuracy on the old training exemplars in test.
This supports the assumption that the far exemplars of the high-variability category do not
influence classification of the intermediate exemplars, which was used in making predictions
for the GCM.
Results
Average results. Participants were very accurate in their training classifications. On
average, the mean proportion of correct responses in training was .91. A six-way ANOVA
(Category Mean Category Variance Assignment x Category Label x Condition Order x
Rectangle or Ellipse x Condition x Category) was run to check that none of the
counterbalanced factors, or the category structure, affected training performance. There were
no significant main effects, F(1, 16) = 2.03, p = .17. 
Performance on old training exemplars was also excellent during transfer (see Table 3).
A six-way ANOVA (Category Mean Category Variance Assignment x Category Label x
Condition Order x Rectangle or Ellipse x Condition x Category) was run to examine whether
any of the control factors had an effect on performance and to check that performance on old
training exemplars was equal for each category. There was a main effect of learning order,
F(1, 16) = 5.84, p < .05, that corresponds to a small (3%) accuracy advantage for the
participants learning the 1:2 condition before the 1:2 Expanded condition. Such an increase in
accuracy should sharpen a generalization gradient, but it should not lead to an increase in the
proportion of responses to one category, which is what we found and what is of interest here.
There were no other significant main effects, largest F(1, 16) = 1.84, p > .05. This means no
other counterbalanced factor had a significant effect on old training exemplars classification in
transfer. 
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Each new test exemplar was of equal distance from the nearest exemplar of the low-
variability category between the two conditions. (That is, the effect of nearest neighbors was
controlled across the two conditions without the adjustment required in Experiment 2.) As in
the previous experiment's analysis the responses given to each of the 21 new transfer
exemplars were collapsed into seven sets. Figure 7 plots the generalization gradient. A six-way
ANOVA (Condition x Stimulus Set x Category Mean Category Variance Assignment x
Category Label x Condition Order x Rectangle or Ellipse) was run. In both the 1:2 and the 1:2
Expanded conditions, the proportion of high variability responses to test exemplars increased
as the location of the test exemplar moved toward the high-variability category, F(6, 96) =
277.20, p < .05 (Huynh-Feldt  = 1.00). There was almost no difference between the
proportion of high-variability responses in the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions, F(1, 16) =
0.25, p > .05. There was no significant interaction between stimulus and condition, F(6, 96) =
0.61, p > .05 (Huynh-Feldt  = 0.74). None of the counterbalanced factors had a significant
effect, largest F(1, 16) = 3.88, p > .05. 
Individual participant results. As for Experiment 2, when generalization gradients
were calculated for individual participants they showed that many participants had very
different gradients for the two conditions. The results, averaged across participants, did not
represent individual performance well. When the distant exemplars of the more variable
category were moved to be more extreme points, 8 participants showed an increase in their
proportion of high-variability responses to the transfer exemplars, whereas the remaining 24
showed a decrease. Further, for many of these participants the change was larger than would
be expected by chance. As before a chi-squared analysis was performed for each participant,
with the trial as the unit of analysis. Nineteen participants showed a significant difference
between their responding in the two conditions, 4 increasing and 15 decreasing their
proportion of high-variability responses as the difference in variability between the two
conditions increased. The probability of obtaining 19 or more significant differences (i.e., p
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< .05) by chance, under the assumption that there is no difference between the proportion of
high-variability response between the two conditions is 3.5210-17 assuming that the number
of significant results is binomially distributed (n = 32, p = .05).
As previously mentioned, an alternative account of these individual participant data is
to postulate random fluctuations in response bias between the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded
conditions. This hypothesis could certainly predict individual differences. Some participants
would decrease their bias for the high-variability category in the 1:2 Expanded condition
compared to the 1:2 condition. These participants would therefore show a decrease in high-
variability-category responses in the 1:2 Expanded condition compared with the 1:2 condition.
Similarly, some participants could show the opposite pattern. A key prediction from this
random-response-bias hypothesis is that for any participant, the probability of showing either
pattern is .5. However only 8 out of 32 participants did show an increase in high-variability
responses between the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions. The probability of 8 or fewer
participants showing an increase is .0035, assuming a binomial distribution for the number of
participants showing an increase (n = 32, p = .5). The random-response-bias hypothesis may
therefore be rejected. It is possible that there might have been some systematic cause of
changes in response bias, which would change the probability of increasing high-variability-
category bias between the 1:2 and 1:2 Expanded conditions from a chance level of .5.
However, because the order of each condition and the assignment of condition to shapes was
counterbalanced across participants, it is not clear what the response bias could vary with,
other than the factor of interest - the change in category structure. 
Discussion 
Moving the distant exemplars of the high-variability category to more distant locations
did not alter the generalization gradient obtained from averaged participants' data. This result
is consistent with the predictions of the GCM and Normal GRT. However, as in the previous
experiment, individual participant data was not well described by the average data. For the
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majority of participants, moving the distant exemplars had a large effect on their performance
on the intermediate exemplars. Both the GCM and Normal GRT are unable to account for this
result. Further, significantly more participants than would be expected by chance showed a
decrease in the proportion of high variability responses. Thus the alternative hypothesis raised
in the Discussion section of Experiment 2 - that individual differences are due to random
fluctuations between conditions in individual's response biases or perceptual spaces - can be
rejected because this hypothesis predicts that increases and decreases in the proportion of high
variability responses should be equally likely. The possibility that these findings might be
explained by fluctuations that are nonrandom is not ruled out.
In summary, although average data are consistent with both exemplar and
distributional approaches, at the level of individual participants the data for the majority
cannot be explained by either approach. 
General Discussion
In the experiments presented in this article we investigated whether categorization
performance is based on similarity to stored category exemplars or the likelihood of the data in
relation to a probability distribution inferred from the data. Modeling using an exemplar model
(the GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) and a distributional model (Normal GRT; Ashby & Townsend,
1986) demonstrated that the two accounts make qualitatively different predictions for the
classification of a critical exemplar exactly in-between the nearest exemplars of two categories
that differ in variability. The exemplar model predicted classification of the critical exemplar
into the more similar, lower variability category, but the distributional model predicted
classification into the more likely, higher variability category. 
Experiment 1 showed that the critical exemplar was classified into the lower variability
category most often when stimuli were presented sequentially, consistent with the predictions
of the exemplar model. Models of categorization were originally intended to make predictions
for sequentially presented stimuli. However, in nonstandard conditions, in which stimuli were
The Effect     29
presented simultaneously and a hint was given that the two categories differed in variability
(manipulations that were intended to increase the salience of the difference in variability), the
same critical exemplar was classified into the high-variability category most often, consistent
with the predictions of the distributional model. Thus, under some conditions at least, it seems
that participants switched from using an exemplar strategy to using a distributional strategy. 
Further modeling demonstrated that the exemplar and distributional models make
opposite predictions about the effect of increasing the relative variability of the two categories
on classification of exemplars intermediate between the two categories. The exemplar model
predicted that the probability of classifying an intermediate exemplar into the high-variability
category would decrease slightly as the difference in variability increased. At odds with this
prediction, the distributional model predicted that the probability of classifying an intermediate
exemplar into the high-variability category would increase as the difference in variability
increased. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that individual participants' classification of exemplars
intermediate between two categories varied greatly as the relative variability of the pair of
categories was increased. Some participants showed an increase in high-variability-category
responses, consistent with the predictions of Normal GRT, and others showed a decrease,
consistent with the predictions of the GCM. The best construal for GCM and Normal GRT
would be that both kinds of mechanisms are available to people and they can choose between
them. However, this seems to involve the cognitive system in unnecessary duplication, given
that the two approaches produce extremely similar answers under almost all circumstances.
Moreover, this possibility is eliminated by the results of Experiment 3. Experiment 3 replicated
the results of Experiment 2 by using two pairs of categories where both exemplar and
distributional models were constrained to predict no change in the proportion of high-
variability responses to intermediate exemplars as relative variability was increased. The
majority of participants showed a significant change at odds with the predictions of both the
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GCM and Normal GRT. At the level of data averaged across participants, these differences
disappear. That the true form of individual participant data is obscured by averaging further
illustrates the dangers of averaging across participants (Ashby et al., 1994; Maddox, 1999). 
Exemplar and distributional models can be thought of as lying at opposite ends of a
continuum of finite mixture models, where the number of distributions used to represent a
category varies from one, as in Normal GRT, to the number of exemplars of that category, as
in the GCM and standard GRT (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Rosseel, 1996). (Ashby and
Maddox, 1993, and Nosofsky, 1990, also formalize the relationship between exemplar and
distributional models.) Also contained in this continuum are back propagation networks with
sigmoidal activation functions (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) and radial basis
functions (Moody & Darken, 1989). With small numbers of hidden units (and hence, small
numbers of free parameters in relation to the size of the data to be modeled), neural networks
are analogous to distributional models, because they can learn data only with a particular
distributional structure. But if the number of hidden units is large in relation to the amount of
data to be learned, then the neural network becomes analogous to an exemplar model in that
any data set can be modeled, whatever its structure, simply by learning each piece of data
(each exemplar) by rote. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 present a challenge to unitary
accounts of this kind that assume that categorization is achieved by a mechanism at some point
along the continuum between distributional and exemplar models.
Decision-Bound Models
Decision-bound models of categorization may be adapted to offer a potential account
of these results. Decision-bound models include general linear classifiers (e.g., Medin &
Schwanenflugel, 1981; Morrison, 1990; Nilsson, 1965; Townsend & Landon, 1983), general
quadratic classifiers (e.g., Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Maddox, 1992) , and optimal decision rules
(e.g., Fukunaga, 1972; Green & Swets, 1966; Noreen, 1981; Townsend & Landon, 1983).
Decision-bound models are closely related to Normal GRT, except that participants are
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assumed to estimate the parameters of the decision bound directly, rather than calculating the
bound from the inferred normal distributions used to represent each category. 
In the experiments presented in this article, there is a large, empty region between the
two categories, where participants have no training data. Therefore, there is a large set of
perfect decision bounds that participants could use if they are estimating the bound directly.
However, the hypothesis that the individual differences described in Experiment 3 are due to
participants choosing a bound at random from the large set of possible bounds in each
condition fails. This hypothesis predicts that participants would be as likely to move their
decision bound toward the high-variability category in the 1:2 Expanded condition compared
with the 1:2 condition as they would be to move it away from the high-variability category.
Thus, participants would be as likely to show an increase in high-variability-category
responses across conditions as they would be to show a decrease. The finding that the number
of participants showing either pattern differs significantly from this chance hypothesis can be
used to reject the random-decision-bound hypothesis, just as it was used to reject the random-
response-bias hypothesis in Experiments 2 and 3. Thus the selection of the decision bound
from the set of possible bounds must be nonrandom. However, decision-bound theory does
not provide a candidate selection mechanism. Such a mechanism would also have to account
for how the location of this bound might be influenced by knowledge and salience of the
differences in variability, as demonstrated in Experiment 1.
Prototype Models
J. D. Smith and Minda (2000) reviewed the categorization literature and found that
prototype models (e.g., Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; Reed,
1972; Rosch, 1973; Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976) were able to account for performance
on novel training exemplars at least as well as exemplar models (although exemplar models
out-performed prototype models on old training exemplars). Following this renewed interest
in prototype models, the predictions of prototype models for category structures used here is
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described below. 
Prototype models predict classification of exemplars into the category with the nearest
mean. Thus, for the critical exemplar in the category structure used in Experiment 1, prototype
models predict it should be classified into the low-variability category as the mean of this
category is nearest to the critical exemplar. Because the model does not represent variability
information, the variability salience manipulations in Experiment 1 should not have had any
effect. The category means remain unaltered between the 1:2 condition and the 1:4 condition
of Experiment 2, and thus prototype models predict no difference in the (absolute position)
generalization gradients between the two conditions. A significant difference was observed,
contrary to the predictions of prototype models. For Experiment 3, the motion of the extreme
exemplars of the high-variability category to more distant locations (in the 1:2 Expanded
condition, compared to the 1:2 condition) will cause the prototype model to predict more high
variability responses to test exemplars in the 1:2 condition than in the 1:2 Expanded condition.
In Experiment 3 no significant difference was observed in the average data, and the small
numerical difference was in the opposite direction. In summary, prototype models are unable
to account for sensitivity to category variability displayed here. 
Ashby and Gott (1988)
It is worth noting the relationship between this demonstration that participants are
sensitive to the difference in variability of two categories and Ashby and Gott's (1988)
Experiment 3. They used a two dimensional category structure with two categories with
equal, nonidentity covariance matrices with positive covariance between the two dimensions
(illustrated in their Figure 4). The category means differed on a single dimension, and thus the
decision bound predicted by a minimum distance (to prototype) classifier is a straight line of
equal value on the other dimension between the two categories. The optimal linear decision
bound is a diagonal line of positive slope between the two categories. Participants'
classification was best described by the optimal linear decision bound, reflecting participants'
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sensitivity to the correlation of the two dimensions. Thus Ashby and Gott demonstrated that
participants were sensitive to within category covariance. In contrast, the experiments in this
article demonstrated that participants were sensitive to the difference in variability between
two categories. 
Kalish and Kruschke (1997)
Kalish and Kruschke (1997) investigated decision boundaries in a one-dimensional
categorization. In their Experiment 1 they used two overlapping uniformly distributed
categories of different variance. This structure is therefore similar to that used here in
Experiment 1. Although it is perhaps an unfair to use Normal GRT to predict performance on
Kalish and Kruschke's category structure, as their categories are not normally distributed, the
structure does lead to differing predictions for Normal GRT and the GCM. The GCM predicts
a two-step generalization gradient, where Normal GRT predicts a one-step function. Kalish
and Kruschke found that, of 42 participants, 23 showed a one-step function (i.e., a two step
function did not fit significantly better) and 18 showed a two-step function. These results then
provide approximately equal support for either model. 
Conclusion
Averaged across participants, under standard conditions of sequential presentation of
training exemplars, the data presented here favors an exemplar-similarity based account of
classification rather than a distributional account. However, under nonstandard conditions,
when training exemplars were presented simultaneously and participants were told that the
categories differed in variability, performance switched to that predicted by a distributional
account. However, there were large individual differences that neither model could account
for when the relative variability of two categories was manipulated. We are beginning to
explore an alternative account that differs fundamentally from those discussed here in that the
absolute magnitude of stimulus attributes are assumed to be unavailable, and instead that
stimuli are judged relative to one another (Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002).
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Footnotes
1The exemplar model's exact predictions for the classification of the critical exemplar of
course depends on the particular arrangement of exemplars. For example, if the high-
variability exemplars just happen to be nearer to the critical exemplar, the opposite prediction
would be made. However, if exemplars are randomly generated from normally distributed
categories, this is unlikely to be the case.
2The reason it is not certain that the critical exemplar should be categorized as a
member of the high-variability category more often than as a member of the low-variability
category is because the critical exemplar is not equidistant between the means of the two
categories (when this would always be the case). (It is worth pointing out here that if this were
the case then an exemplar model would be able to predict classification of the critical exemplar
into the high-variability category as this category is most likely to have the nearest exemplar.)
Rather, the critical exemplar is equidistant between the nearest neighbors of the two categories
and is therefore nearer the mean of the lower variability category. Thus, the difference in
variability between the two categories need be sufficiently large to counter the fact that the
low-variability category has the nearer mean. 
3Note that participants were not asked for similarity ratings between two objects as is
typical in predicting classification from similarity or identification (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) but
rather gave ratings of the similarity between an object and a category. 
4In fact, because perception is assumed to be noisy, this method only provides the best
estimate of a participant's hypothesized mean and variance. 
5Proof follows by writing out, for each category structure, the expression for the
probability that a given intermediate exemplar will be classified into the high-variability
category according to the GCM and then showing that this value is greater for the 1:4
condition than for the 1:2 condition for all values of c, when exemplars equally distant from
the nearest neighbors of either category are compared. 
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6We thank Thomas S. Wallsten for drawing these alternative potential representations
to our attention.
7We thank Robert M. Nosofsky for suggesting this hypothesis as an alternative
explanation. 
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Table 1




Hint .37 (.09) .74 (.07)
No hint .25 (.06) .51 (.08)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the means.
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Table 2




Low variability .11 (.03) .12 (.03)
High variability .95 (.01) .96 (.01)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the means.
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Table 3
Mean Proportion of High-Variability Responses to Old Training Exemplars in Test for
Experiment 3
Condition
Category 1:2 1:2 Expanded
Low variability .07 (.01) .10 (.02)
High variability .93 (.01) .93 (.01)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the means.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. A one-dimensional example of two categories differing in variability. The exemplars
of the low-variability category happen to take low values on the dimension (squares). The
probability density function from which they were generated is represented by the solid line.
The exemplars of the high-variability category take high values of the dimension (circles). The
probability density function from which they were generated is represented by the dashed line.
A critical example midway between the nearest examples of the two categories (triangle) is
more likely to belong to the high-variability category but is more similar to examples of the
low-variability category. 
Figure 2. Predictions for the probability of a high-variability category response plotted as a
function of the stimulus value for the stimuli used in Experiment 1. The category structure is
illustrated along the top of the figure, with one category more variable than the other. A:
Predictions for the generalized context model (GCM). The three lines correspond to different
values of the generalization parameter, c. (b) Predictions for normal general recognition theory
(GRT). The three lines correspond to different levels of perceptual noise, which is assumed to
be normally distributed with standard deviation p. 
Figure 3. An example of a stimulus set from Experiment 1. 
Figure 4. The arrangement of exemplars in Experiments 2 and 3. The open shapes represent
the 1:2 condition that is used in Experiments 2 and 3. A: For Experiment 2 the solid shapes
represent the 1:4 condition. B: For Experiment 3 the solid shapes represent the 1:2 Expanded
condition (and cover all of the low-variability-category exemplars and half of the high-
variability-category exemplars from the 1:2 condition.)
Figure 5. Predictions for the probability of a high-variability-category response plotted as a
function of the stimulus width (or height) for Experiments 2 and 3. The label "absolute
position" refers to the actual size of exemplars. The label "relative position" refers to the size
of the exemplar compared to the nearest exemplar of the low- (or high-) variability category.
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A: Predictions of normal general recognition theory (GRT) for Experiment 2 (p = 10). B:
Predictions of the genralized context model (GCM) for Experiment 2 (q = 2, r = 2, c = 0.05).
C: Normal GRT predictions for Experiment 2 shown in Panel A plotted as a function of
relative position, rather than absolute position. D: The GCM predictions for Experiment 2
shown in Panel B plotted as a function of relative position, rather than absolute position. E:
Normal GRT predictions for Experiment 3 (p = 10). F: The GCM predictions for Experiment
3 (q = 2, r = 2, c = 0.05). In Panels E and F the gradients for the two conditions are almost
exactly coincident.
Figure 6. The results of the transfer stage of Experiment 2. In Panel A, the results are plotted
as a function of absolute position, and in Panel B the same results are plotted as a function of
relative position.
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